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ISSUE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MULTIPARTY COMPETITION 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How do issues enter the political arena and come to affect party competition? This study 
extends the literature on issue evolution from the US context to multiparty systems. While 
traditional models assume opposition parties to be the agents of issue evolution, this study 
argues that within multiparty competition not all parties in opposition have an incentive to 
change the issue basis of political competition. The central propositions of our issue 
entrepreneurship model are two-fold: first, political parties are more likely to become issue 
entrepreneurs when they are losers on the dominant dimension of contestation. We focus on 
three components of political loss in multiparty systems relating to the office seeking, 
voting-seeking and policy-seeking objectives of parties. Second, parties will choose which 
issue to promote on the basis of their internal cohesion and proximity to the mean voter on 
that same issue. We test these propositions by examining the evolution of the issue of 
European integration in 14 European party systems from 1984 to 2006. The time-series 
cross-section analyses lend strong support to our model. 
 
Key Words: Issue entrepreneurship, Issue evolution, Multiparty systems, Political parties. 
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Introduction 
 
To speak of politics is to speak of political issues, almost invariably. We speak of them as if 
we knew of them. But we truly do not. We do not know why they arise, why one question 
rather than another comes to seem important, why it happens at a particular time, rather 
than another, why some last, why some do not. (Carmines & Stimson, 1989: 3) 
 
The above quote by Edward Carmines and James Stimson highlights the importance of 
understanding when and why issues arise and alter the nature of party and electoral 
competition. While recently much scholarly attention has been devoted to the questions of why 
parties compete on different dimensions and why parties and policy makers are more or less 
responsive to voters on these dimensions (see for example Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2007; Meguid 
2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Dolezal et al. 2014), the precise mechanisms underlying changes 
in the dimensional structure of competition have received much less attention, especially within 
multiparty systems. To date, most studies examining how issues emerge stem from the US context. 
Carmines and Stimson’s (1986, 1989, 1993) seminal work outlines a model of issue evolution 
driven by the electoral competition between two parties, where the party that is in the minority, and 
thus occupies a disadvantageous position within the system, has an incentive to change the issue 
basis of party competition and “upset the dominant party alignment” (Carmines and Stimson 1993, 
154). Similarly, Riker uses the metaphor of the market to explain why losers in the political game 
will try to find some alternative that beats the current winner (Riker 1982). The model of issue 
evolution has been successfully applied to explain the rise of issues, such as slavery (Riker 1982), 
racial segregation (Carmines and Stimson 1986), abortion (Adams 1997) and “culture wars issues” 
(Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002) in the US context. But this still leaves the question of how 
this model can be applied to explain issue evolution in more institutionally complex systems in 
which parties face two, three or even more rivals. 
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The aim of this study is to explore how issues evolve and become politicized in West 
European polities characterized by multiparty competition and coalition governments. Studying the 
dynamics of issue competition within Western Europe is ever more important as scholars have 
argued that since the 1970s party and electoral competition is increasingly structured by a diversity 
of policy issues rather than long-established societal cleavages (Franklin, et al 1992; Mair 1997). 
We explore the dynamics of issue competition by examining which parties are the agents in the 
politicization of issues. Importantly, we introduce the concept of issue entrepreneurship which 
allows us to understand the dynamics of party competition within multiparty systems. 
Issue entrepreneurship refers to a strategy by which parties mobilize issues that have been 
largely ignored in party competition and adopt a policy position on the issue that is substantially 
different from the mainstream status quo.  Such a strategy is inherently risky since the 
mobilization of such issues may destabilize parties internally, put off certain voters and jeopardize 
future coalition negations. However, issue entrepreneurship also carries the potential of reshaping 
political competition and thus reaping electoral success. In line with the theories of issue 
evolution we expect those parties that occupy losing positions on the dominant dimension of 
political competition to act as issue entrepreneurs and thus to play a key role in the politicization 
of issues. While in a two-party system losers can be easily classified as the party that is in 
opposition, the distinction between political winners and losers is less clear-cut in multiparty 
systems which are usually governed by coalition governments. In order to deal with these 
complexities, we develop a conceptualization of “political loss” based on political parties’ office-, 
vote- and policy-seeking objectives. Specifically, we focus on three components of “political 
loss”: inexperience in government, electoral defeat and positions on the main dimension of party 
competition that are far from the mean voter. Parties that are “winners” in multiparty systems are 
those that routinely alternate between government and opposition and occupy winning and 
majoritarian positions within the system. Due to their overall advantageous position, they have an 
incentive to reinforce existing patterns of political competition and the policy issues underlying 
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them. Consequently, they are not likely issue entrepreneurs. In contrast parties that have never 
held political office, have experienced electoral defeat and/or occupy a non-majoritarian position 
on the dominant dimension of political conflict are likely issue entrepreneurs. Due to their losing 
positions in the political system, they have an incentive to mobilize issues that could disturb the 
political equilibrium in order to potentially reap electoral benefits.  
This model of issue entrepreneurship can potentially be applied to the dynamics of issue 
evolution on a large range of issues. In this study, we test our theoretical conjectures by 
examining the dynamics of issue competition regarding the European Union (EU). The EU issue 
provides an excellent testing ground for three reasons. First, given that every EU member state is 
confronted with issues arising from European integration we can test the issue entrepreneurship 
model in a wide variety of political contexts. Second, our model aims to explain the politicization 
of issues that cannot neatly be subsumed by the dominant dimension of conflict and EU 
integration is a primary example of such an issue (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Third, we can utilize 
two rich data sources on party and voter attitudes towards European integration, namely the 
Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and the Eurobarometer Surveys, which allow us to inspect the 
dynamics of issue competition. We employ time-series cross-section analysis to test our 
theoretical propositions. Our findings lend strong support to our model by showing that political 
losers are most likely to act as issue entrepreneurs, but that they only mobilize a previously 
ignored issue when this is seen as a vote-maximizing strategy and when the party is united on the 
issue. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section briefly reviews the literature on issue 
evolution and introduces our theory of issue entrepreneurship. Next, the case selection, data and 
methods are elaborated. Thereafter, the results of the empirical analysis are presented. Finally, the 
study concludes by highlighting the implications of the findings. 
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Theory of Issue Entrepreneurship 
This study sets out to explore the conditions under which issues that have previously been ignored 
in party competition become politicized. The work on issue evolution by Carmines and Stimson 
(1986, 1989, 1993) and on issue manipulation and heresthetics by William Riker (1982, 1986, 
1996) provide important stepping stones for understanding the way in which issues evolve. Both 
approaches stress the importance of strategic politicians. Carmines and Stimson (1986, 1989, 1993) 
sketch a sequence of how political elites set in motion a process of electoral and party system 
change. Borrowing conceptual tools from the biological notion of natural selection, their theoretical 
framework describes issue evolution as the struggle among rival parties or candidates regarding 
which issues should dominate the political agenda. Politicians act as strategic agents that compete 
over the public attention for issues. Parties want to associate themselves with winning issues, and 
thus if a party finds itself confronted with a streak of losses it will attempt to redirect political 
competition. In this understanding of party competition, issues are likely introduced by parties that 
occupy losing positions within the system as they have an incentive to unseat the existing political 
equilibrium in order to reap electoral gains (see Carmines and Stimson 1993). This logic is also at 
the heart of what Riker (1996, 9-10) coins “heresthetics”. Heresthetics refers to a political strategy 
by which parties structure political competition in such a way that they gain leverage from 
competing on a pre-existing dimension on which advantages are already held or by introducing an 
issue dimension that allows them to reshuffle the current structure of party competition to their 
advantage. Building on this work, we expect political parties that do not occupy a winning position 
in the political system to play a crucial role in the politicization of previously ignored issues.1  
Political losers have incentives to promote previously ignored issues, or issues with the 
potential to destabilize the political equilibrium, in order to improve their electoral fortunes. 2 One 
                                                          
1Whereas many studies have examined issue competition - that is why parties decide to compete on certain issues and 
ignore others (see e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010) - few studies have focused on issue evolution - that is when 
and why previously ignored issues enter the political arena - in multiparty systems. 
2
 Note that it is virtually impossible to distinguish a previously ignored and not divisive issue from an entirely new issue. Although 
entirely new issues that have not previously been in play in party competition are quite rare, they may emerge from time to time. 
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way in which a party can introduce an issue is to adopt a polarizing position on that issue.  When 
parties are in perfect agreement on an issue, it is less likely to become important in political debate 
(Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989; Carmines and Stimson 1989).  We coin the term issue 
entrepreneurship to denote the party strategy of active mobilization of a previously ignored and not 
divisive issue by adopting a policy position on that issue that is substantially different from the 
status quo position of the mainstream.  To establish which parties are likely issue entrepreneurs, we 
must first establish which parties should be classified as political losers in multiparty systems. The 
work of Carmines and Stimson and Riker was developed in a two-party system and suggests that 
political losers are those parties that currently do not occupy political office. When we apply these 
ideas to multiparty system contexts, this distinction becomes less clear-cut. Within multiparty 
competition parties aim to satisfy three goals: office, policy, and votes (see Müller and Strøm 
1999).  A key distinction between two-party and multiparty systems is that the maximization of 
votes will not automatically ensure office.  Indeed, most multiparty systems are governed by a 
coalition of parties and some parties routinely alternate between government and opposition while 
others may never enter government coalitions (Hobolt and Karp 2010). In order to deal with these 
complexities, we define political losers on the basis of three components: office-holding 
experience, distance to average party position on the dominant dimension of party competition and 
electoral defeat. These components coincide with the three chief goals of party behavior within 
multiparty competition: votes, policy and office. 
Firstly, government experience captures parties’ office-seeking incentives. Parties that 
have previously held political office are more likely to become members of future government 
coalitions as they have built a reputation for being good coalition partners, for abiding coalition 
accords and for working effectively with other parties (Warwick 1996; Laver and Schofield 1998; 
Sartori 2005; Tavits 2008). In other words, previous coalition membership indicates that parties 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
One can think of an issue like stem cell research in US party competition for example (Hillygus and Shields 2008). In this case, in 
line with our issue entrepreneurship model, one would expect that parties that are “losing” on the dominant dimension of party 
competition would aim to mobilize this issue and take a divergent stance than the political mainstream as this will more likely bring 
electoral success. Yet, we acknowledge that we are not able to distinguish a previously ignored and not divisive issue from and an 
entirely new issue. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.  
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have a high coalition potential, and entering into coalitions with them in the future is less costly 
(Sartori 2005). Following the work of Carmines and Stimson and Riker we know that issue 
entrepreneurship always is a risky strategy for parties. It may alienate more voters than it attracts. 
Within a multiparty context, this risk is exacerbated by the fact that introducing a previously 
ignored issue may not only distance voters, but may also jeopardize future coalition negotiations. 
As a consequence, it is primarily parties that have low coalition potential, and thus little to lose in 
terms of alienating potential coalition parties, who are expected to engage in such a strategy. Issue 
entrepreneurship is simply too risky strategy for all other parties.  We can thus formulate our first 
hypothesis concerning office experience. 
H1a: Parties that have not previously been in government are more likely to adopt an 
issue entrepreneurial strategy than parties that are currently in office or have 
previously held office, all else being equal. 
 
Second, we focus on parties vote-seeking objectives.  A clear indication of political loss in 
the electoral arena is election defeat, that is to say vote loss in previous elections. According to 
Müller and Strøm (1999) parties’ chief objective is to maximize their vote share in an election, as 
this may eventually allow them to gain access to office, and enact their policy objectives. Party 
leaders that have experienced electoral defeat will also be under pressure to change strategy, for 
example by introducing new issues that have the potential to be a vote winner in the next election. 
In contrast, parties that have performed well in the last election have an incentive to reinforce 
existing patterns of political competition and the issues underlying them. Electoral winners will 
therefore seek to mobilize “issues of the past” as these contributed to their profitable position 
within the system in the first place (Carmines and Stimson 1993, 154), whereas electoral losers will 
more inclined to engage in issue entrepreneurship.  This leads to our electoral defeat hypothesis. 
H1b: Parties that have experienced electoral defeat are more likely to adopt an issue 
entrepreneurial strategy than parties that had electoral success, all else being equal. 
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Thirdly, policy-seeking incentives are of course most easily obtained by parties that are part 
of the government. But even parties outside government can sometimes influence policy in 
multiparty systems, especially if they occupy a position closer to the median party in parliament. 
The further a party is removed from the average party position, the more difficult it will be for that 
party to form a government or rally support for its policy initiatives in parliament (e.g. Laver and 
Schofield 1998). Hence, parties that occupy positions far from the average party position have 
additional incentives to try to introduce a previously ignored issue that is not easily subsumed 
within dominant dimension of conflict in order to generate the possibilities of new policy coalitions 
on this new issue and to potentially drive wedge between existing coalition parties and divisions 
within parties (Jeong et al 2011; Van Der Wardt et al 2014). This leads to the policy distance 
hypothesis: 
H1c: Parties that are far from the median party position on the dominant dimension of 
conflict are more likely to adopt an issue entrepreneurial strategy than parties that 
occupy a position close to the median, all else being equal. 
 
While we argue that each of these components encourages parties to engage in issue 
entrepreneurship, they are of course highly interrelated. Parties gain office on the basis of favorable 
election results, and given that they are in office they are likely not far removed from the average 
party position on the main dimension of political competition. In contrast, parties with no 
experience of office are also more likely to occupy a non-majoritarian position on the dominant 
dimension of political conflict.  Such parties are faced by a natural electoral ceiling on the existing 
dominant dimension of political competition as they are far removed from the average voter and 
party position. Due to their disadvantageous position within political competition, political losers 
thus have an incentive to mobilize previously ignored issues to destabilize the current equilibrium 
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of party competition. 3 
While our expectations concerning issue entrepreneurship build on the classic work by 
Carmines and Stimson as well as Riker, they also deviate in important ways. According to the 
classic model of issue evolution in two-party systems also opposition parties would have incentives 
to act as issue entrepreneurs. The key difference in a multiparty context is that coalition 
governments create differential strategic incentives for parties. Hence in multiparty systems, even 
parties that are in opposition may not wish to highlight a previously ignored issue that cuts across 
the dominant dimension of conflict, as this could remove them from the mainstream and jeopardize 
their future coalition potential. For most parties with coalition potential, the possible electoral gains 
of issue entrepreneurship will not outweigh the potential costs associated loss of future coalition 
partners. However, parties without office experience and with positions removed from the 
mainstream, the likelihood of joining coalitions is low due to uncertainty about their behavior and 
the potential costs of forming a coalition (see Warwick 1996; Laver and Schofield 1998; Sartori 
2005; Tavits 2008). Parties in such a situation thus have every reason to act as issue entrepreneurs 
as they have very little to lose in terms of existing relationships or future coalition potential.  
 
Choosing a Winning Issue 
The question now becomes which issue are issue entrepreneurs likely to mobilize? The selection of 
an issue is of key importance to the strategy of issue entrepreneurship as it is of no use to a party to 
                                                          
3
 Our discussion of the main components of “political loss” also relates to recent work on party competition in multiparty 
systems which distinguishes between mainstream and so-called “niche” parties (see Meguid 2005, 2008; Adams et al 
2006). In her seminal work on the electoral success of niche parties, Meguid (2005, 2008) defines niche parties as those 
parties that “reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics” and raise new issues that “are not only novel, but they 
often do not coincide with existing lines of political division” and that “differentiate themselves by limiting their issue 
appeals” (2005: 347-348). Adams et al (2006, 513) classify niche parties as “members of the Communist, Green, and 
extreme nationalist party families” in their study of how niche parties respond to public opinion. In his recent work on 
niche parties, Wagner (2011) has proposed that niche parties are best defined as parties that compete primarily on a small 
number of non-economic issues. Unlike these studies, the objective of our theoretical model is to predict the impact of 
specific components of “political loss” on the likelihood of becoming an issue entrepreneur, and hence it would be 
potentially tautologous for us to instead define party types on the basis of their issue-politics. So, while there may some 
overlap between our discussion of political losers as issue entrepreneurs and the conceptualization niche parties, it is 
important to note a key conceptual distinction. We define political loss on the basis of office-holding experience, past 
election results and position on the dominant dimension, rather than focus on a type of parties that belong to a certain 
party family or differentiate themselves in terms of single-issue appeals.  
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introduce and mobilize an issue on which it cannot win (Riker 1982; Vavreck 2009, 208-9). We 
hypothesize that issue selection for issue entrepreneurs is likely based on two factors: the degree of 
internal division within the party on the issue and the distance to the mean voter on the issue. The 
degree to which a party is internally divided over the previously ignored issue is expected to affect 
the extent to which a party employs an issue entrepreneurial strategy. Parties act as issue 
entrepreneurs by offering voters new issue options in order to reap potential electoral benefits and 
advance their strategic position within the system. Recent research demonstrates that the extent to 
which parties gain votes on the basis of the mobilization of previously ignored issue is highly 
conditional upon the degree of internal unity on the issue (see for example De Vries 2010). The 
intuition here is simple: the higher the strife over the issue within a party, the less likely it is that 
voters will vote for this party on the basis of this issue. When a party is internally divided, that is to 
say when parties provide voters with conflicting information on the issue, voters are unable to 
determine which of the parties closely mirror their own position. The presentation of competing 
messages by party leaders and/or officials muddles the cues sent by parties regarding a particular 
issue to voters (see Zaller 1992; Steenbergen et al 2007). Mobilizing an issue without having a 
clear issue stance will then be more of an electoral liability than an asset. This may be especially 
the case for parties that occupy losing positions within the system. Political losers may wish to 
maximize their electoral success to eventually gain access to political office by introducing an 
issue, yet they cannot pursue this goal at any cost. Emphasizing a previously ignored issue, parties 
potentially jeopardize their internal cohesion. Parties thus have to be mindful towards keeping 
“party activists in the fold, because they are critical to the survival of the party” (Steenbergen and 
Scott 2004, 171). Parties that are losers on the dominant dimension of conflict are therefore likely 
to only introduce an issue when they are united on it in order not to further weaken their already 
marginal position in the party system. This reasoning is formalized in the following two 
hypotheses: 
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H2a: A party that is more united on an issue is less likely to adopt an issue entrepreneurial strategy, all 
else being equal. 
H2b: Internal division on an issue has a greater negative effect on the likelihood of party 
political losers adopting an issue entrepreneurial strategy compared to other parties, all else 
being equal. 
 
The distance between a party and the mean voter on an issue is also expected to affect the 
extent to a party employs an issue entrepreneurial strategy. This expectation is derived from spatial 
theories of voting where voters choose parties with the policy positions closest to their own 
(Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984). We expect parties to adopt an issue entrepreneurial 
strategy when the distance between the party’s position and the mean voter position on the issue is 
small. Vote-seeking is among the chief objectives of political parties (Downs 1957; Mu¨ ller and 
Strøm 1999), so they have an incentive to promote previously ignored issues if they feel that this 
would result in an increase of their vote share. From this perspective, those parties which positions 
on the new issue are closer to the mean voter position are more likely to be issue entrepreneurs. In 
contrast, parties may wish to downplay an issue, if their position is too far removed from the mean 
electorate. This leads to the following hypothesis:4  
H3: A party that holds a position on an issue closer to the mean voter position is 
more likely to adopt an issue entrepreneurial strategy, all else being equal. 
                                                          
4
 The expectation outlined above is in line with the idea that parties respond to the general electorate, i.e. the 
mean voter (see Downs 1957). An equally compelling vision of party behavior emphasizes party responsiveness to 
the mean party supporter (Adams et al 2006; Ezrow et al 2011). This latter model is argued to be especially important 
for understanding party behavior in multiparty systems. Unlike parties in two-party, single-member plurality systems, 
parties operating in a multiparty system using proportional representation may seek to maximize votes not by 
adopting the position of the mean voter on the new issue, but by adopting a position away from the mean voter 
position, closer to their party supporters (Adams et al 2006; Ezrow et al 2011). This strategy can be a successful vote 
maximizing strategy in a multiparty system if there is polarization of voter preferences on the new issue dimension 
and when the positions of mainstream parties on the new policy issue converge. In this light, we would expect 
parties to be issue entrepreneurs when they are closer to their partisan voters on the issue. We have empirically 
tested this expectation, see Table 3 in the Supporting Information. The results, however, provide little empirical 
evidence for the partisan voter model compared to the mean voter model. These findings support the idea that issue 
entrepreneurship is a vote-seeking strategy. Put differently, issue entrepreneurs mobilize new issues in order to 
attract new voters, rather than rallying constituents who already support the party. 
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Case Selection, Data and Operationalizations 
Our theory of issue entrepreneurship presents a general model about the conditions under which 
previously ignored issues become politicized and thus can be applied to a large range of issues. We 
test our theoretical conjectures by examining the dynamics of the EU issue. The EU issue constitutes 
an excellent object of study for several reasons. First, every EU member state is confronted with 
policy issues arising from European integration and consequently, we can test the issue 
entrepreneurship model in a wide variety of political contexts. While countries in Western Europe 
are all longstanding members of the Union and have experienced a comparable impact of the EU 
integration process, research demonstrates that the impact of the EU issue on party competition 
varies substantially across the region (e.g. De Vries 2007, 2010; Hobolt 2009; Kriesi et al 2006, 
2008). Second, our model aims to explain the politicization of previously ignored issues in 
multiparty competition. Over the past two decades, immigration and European integration are the 
clearest examples of politicization of issues that are not clearly aligned with the left-right dimension 
within European multiparty systems (e.g. Kriesi et al 2006, 2008). While EU membership is not a 
novel phenomenon to most West European countries, it has not traditionally been politicized by 
mainstream political parties (e.g. De Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe, et al 2002).  
Third, when applying our model of issue entrepreneurship to the EU issue, we can utilize 
two rich data sources on party and voter attitudes towards European integration, namely the Chapel 
Hill Expert Surveys (henceforth, CHES) on party positioning regarding European integration and 
the Eurobarometer Surveys (henceforth, EB) on public opinion. These data sources provide us with 
empirical measures of all our key theoretical concepts. We study the extent of EU issue 
entrepreneurship in 14 West European countries between 1984 and 2006. This region and time-
frame provides us with a unique testing ground to determine which factors account for the dynamics 
in EU issue entrepreneurship. Finally, one could argue that the EU integration issue constitutes a 
rather conservative test of the issue entrepreneurship model within the time-span of investigation, 
1984-2006. The politicization of immigration was more pronounced during this time-period and the 
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prerogative of parties on the right extreme of the political spectrum which fits our theoretical 
conjectures really well. Ideally, we would be able to apply our model of issue entrepreneurship to 
the immigration issue, but unfortunately, we lack the appropriate longitudinal and cross-national 
data to do so. Yet, secondary literature on the dynamics of immigration issue in Western Europe 
does lend some support for issue entrepreneurship model. One of the clearest examples of party 
conflict over immigration is found in the Netherlands. Throughout the last three decades Dutch 
political competition has been characterized by a strong mobilization of immigration by far right 
parties, while mainstream Dutch parties have been reluctant to emphasize the issue (Pellikaan et al 
2003; Adams et al 2012). Most notably after 9/11 the rightwing political outsider and entrepreneur 
Pim Fortuyn and his party the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) skillfully exploited negative public sentiment 
about immigration and was able to attract voters from both the left and moderate right side of the 
political spectrum who would not have voted for the LPF due to their left-right stance (Pellikaan et 
al 2007; De Vries et al 2013). Against this backdrop we would expect that our issue 
entrepreneurship model would also apply to the immigration issue and similar issues, although this 
is ultimately a question for future research. 
In order to test our model of issue entrepreneurship, our first task is to operationalize and 
measure the dependent variable, namely EU issue entrepreneurship of parties. As described above, 
we define a party as an issue entrepreneur, when it actively promotes a previously ignored issue 
and adopts a position that is different from that of the mean position in the party system. Our 
definition of issue entrepreneurship thus combines issue salience – the importance that a party 
attaches to the issue – and issue position – relative to the mean party position. Consequently, we 
need measures of both party positions on the EU dimension and the emphasis that parties place on 
this dimension.5 
For both position and salience measures, we rely on CHES (Ray 1999; Steenbergen and 
                                                          
5One possible concern is that by focusing on the EU issue our results could be driven by single-issue anti-EU parties, that is parties 
whose primary focus is a Eurosceptic policy position. To ensure that this is not in fact the case we have run a sensitivity analysis 
where we exclude such single-issue parties (Junilistan in Sweden, Rassemblement pour la France/ Mouvement Pour la France in 
France, United Kingdom Independence Party in the UK, Liste Dr. Hans-Peter Martin in Austria) from the analysis. Excluding these 
parties makes almost no difference to the results (see Table 4 in the Supporting Information). 
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Marks 2007; Hooghe et al 2010). CHES is ideal for our purposes since it includes estimates of 
party positions on several issue dimensions as well as the salience that each party attaches to 
European integration. The dataset covers expert evaluations of national political parties in a variety 
of European countries, between 1984 and 2006.6  Since our theory is most appropriately applied to 
institutionalized party systems, where the dominant dimension of contestation is clearly 
established, we only include the 14 West European countries in our analysis, thus excluding the 
recently accessed post-communist states.7 Several studies have cross-validated the measures of 
CHES and found that expert data outperform other data sources, such as the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP) data and mass survey data. In their study of party positioning on 
European integration, Marks et al (2007) find that experts, manifestos and voter and candidate 
surveys provide convergent measures of EU party positions, but that expert data (CHES) is the 
most valid among those sources. In a similar cross-validation exercise of different EU salience 
measures, Netjes and Binnema (2007) also conclude that expert surveys outperform the other 
salience measures in terms of explanatory power. So, while the CHES data contain a shorter time-
series than the CMP data, they provide high-quality cross-national data on both party positions and 
salience on the European integration dimension. In order to derive at a yearly measure of EU issue 
entrepreneurship, we imputed the data by calculating the difference between the party placements 
in the respective CHES surveys and averaging out these changes for the years in between the two 
data-points. This type of linear interpolation is commonly used for party and public opinion time 
series data when data time points are missing (see e.g. Soroka and Wlezien 2010). However, to 
demonstrate that the results hold even without imputation, we have run all our model on the smaller 
                                                          
6
 Note that the 1984, 1989 and 1992 expert placements were asked retrospectively (Ray 1999). This introduces the 
possibility that experts used their 1996 placements as proxies for their judgments in earlier years. In order to check 
for this we ran the models presented in Table 1 excluding the placements prior to 1996. The full and partial models 
yield similar results. These results are provided in Table 4, model 2, in the Supporting Information. 
7
 We include all Western European member states of the EU (except for Luxembourg which is not included in the 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey). Note that the recently accessed post-communist states are excluded for two reasons. 
First, since these countries only accessed the EU in 2004 we lack data for the parties in these countries over time. 
Second, the model we outline is most appropriate for established party systems. Although party systems and party 
competition are beginning to stabilize in Central and Eastern Europe, at least the first decade of democracy in the 
post-Communist countries was characterized by highly unstable patterns of party competition and high volatility in 
the party systems (see Bakke and Sitter 2005). 
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non-imputed dataset, and all our main findings hold. Model 3b in Table 1 show the results using 
the non-imputed dataset. 
To measure EU issue entrepreneurship we combine a party’s EU salience score with their 
distance to the mean party position on the EU dimension. Specifically, for each party we multiply 
its EU salience score with the distance between its party position and the average position of all 
parties in the system on the EU issue (EU issue distance). EU issue salience for each party is 
measured in CHES by asking experts to evaluate ‘the relative importance of the issue in the party’s 
public stance’ on a five-point scale, ranging from European integration is of no importance, never 
mentioned by the party’ (1) to ‘European integration is the most important issue for the party’ (5). 
Party positions on the European integration dimension are operationalized by using an expert 
question about the ‘overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration’ on a 7-
point scale, where 1 is strongly opposed and 7 is strongly in favor. EU issue distance is measured 
by calculating the distance between the mean EU position of all parties in a given country and year 
subtracted by the EU position of each individual party. This distance variable is constructed so that 
positive values indicate that a party is more Euroskeptic than the mean party position and negative 
values indicate that a party is more pro-European than the mean party position. By combining the 
salience and distance measures, EU issue entrepreneurship captures the extent to which a party 
attaches importance to the EU issue and adopts a different (and more Euroskeptic) position than the 
mean party position.8  
To measure our independent variables we firstly need to capture the extent to which parties 
are “losers” on the dominant dimension of contestation. We hypothesized that parties in losing 
positions have greater incentives to challenge the existing political order by becoming issue 
entrepreneurs. In the issue entrepreneurship model, we outline three key components of “political 
loss”: lack of government experience, the distance to the average party position on the dominant 
                                                          
8
 To capture a “new” position on the issue of European integration, this asymmetric measure is justified in the case of 
the issue of European integration, since the literature has shown that the consensus position in West European 
party systems is a pro-European position (e.g. de Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe et al 2002). 
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dimension and electoral defeat. We measure each of these components separately, and also 
combine them in a “political loser scale”. 
Government experience is captured by distinguishing between three types of office-holding 
experience:  parties that are current members of the governing coalition (reference category), 
parties that are in opposition but have previously participated in a governing coalition, and parties 
that have never participated in a governing coalition. We also tested a different operationalization 
of coalition membership, namely the years in which a party has been in government within the 
time-span of investigation, 1984- 2006. A model utilizing this operationalization yields 
substantively identical results (see Table 2 in the Supporting Information). The Distance to the 
Mean Party on the Dominant Dimension is computed by measuring the position on the dominant 
dimension of contestation in Western Europe, namely the left-right dimension (McDonald and 
Budge 2005). We use CHES responses to the question on parties left-right stance on economic 
issues in a given year, where 0 denotes the extreme left and 10 the extreme right. In order to 
capture the distance between the mean party position and the position of a single party on the left-
right dimension, we subtracted a party’s left-right position from the mean left-right position of all 
parties in the system. Since we are interested only in the degree of the distance between the left-
right position of party and the mean party, but not in the direction, i.e. not if a party is more left- or 
rightwing than the mean party position, we calculated absolute values. The final political loser 
component relates to the electoral success of a party in the previous elections. Electoral Defeat is 
measured as the change in percentage of votes a party received in election t versus election t-1, so 
comparing one election to the previous election. We coded this variable in such a way that higher 
positive values indicate electoral losses, whereas lower or negative values indicate electoral gains. 
Given the fact that we focus on three dimensions of political loss, office-, policy- and vote-seeking 
incentives on the dominant dimension, we created a single scale tapping into the three components 
of political loss outlined above. Mokken analysis shows that these items form a strong scale.   
Now we turn to the measurement of the factors that determine whether a party is likely to 
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be a ‘winner’ on the previously ignored issue dimension, and thus has the incentive to act as an 
issue entrepreneur. There are two aspects that may determine the likelihood of becoming a winner 
on the previously ignored issue dimension: distance to the mean voter and internal party unity on 
the issue. Distance to the Mean Voter on the EU Dimension is measured by calculating the 
distance between a party’s EU position and the mean voter position on this same dimension. To 
compute party positions, we have used the expert responses to the EU position question from the 
CHES data. To capture the mean voter position on the EU in each country and year, we use EB 
surveys. In these surveys approximately 2000 respondents in each country and in each year were 
asked the following question: “Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership 
of the European Community/ European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor 
bad?” We use the mean score of this 3-point scale to construct the mean voter EU position.  
Finally, we measure Internal Dissent on the EU using CHES responses to the question on the 
degree of dissent in a party on European integration in a given year, ranging from 1 (complete 
unity) to 5 (leadership opposed by party majority). We created an interaction with political loss to 
capture the possible greater negative effect of internal division on the adoption of an issue 
entrepreneurial strategy for parties’ experiencing political loss compared to other parties.  
In addition to these variables, our models also include two control variables. First, we 
control for party size (measured as the percentage of votes obtained in the latest parliamentary 
elections), since it may be argued that larger parties are less likely to become issue entrepreneurs. 
Second, we control for general Euroskepticism in a country, since we want to control for the 
effect of increases in Euroskepticism over time in certain countries. Here we also use the 
Eurobarometer question on support for EU membership. The variable is coded as the country 
mean at time t, where higher values indicate more support and lower values greater 
Euroskepticism. The descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in Table 2 in the 
Appendix. Next we turn to the statistical estimation of our models. 
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Methods 
Our pooled panel dataset covers a period from 1984 to 2006, with 160 parties nested within those 
years and 14 countries. To estimate a model with such a structure requires specific attention to both 
differences between countries and parties, panel differences, and time-series dependencies, 
autocorrelation. We estimate the model using a simple party-year panel setup, but we still need to 
account for the possible existence of unobserved differences between countries. We thus include 
country dummies to control for omitted variables that may differ between countries. We do not 
include fixed effects for parties, since the unobserved heterogeneity is found mainly at the country 
rather than the party level. Including party family dummies and other party-level controls in the 
model also makes no difference to the results.9  
Country dummies, however, do not eliminate all problems with the panel data estimation 
strategy. To begin with, it is likely that the error terms have a different variance from one panel to 
the next, heteroskedastic error terms, and also that they are correlated across panels, that is to say 
serial correlation. In order to account for these problems, we have followed the strategy advocated 
by Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) used panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). A further problem 
arises from the potential for autocorrelation in the dependent variable. Auto- correlation exists 
when observations of the dependent variable are correlated across time within panels. Inspection of 
panel residuals suggests that they have a first-order autoregressive, AR(1), structure. This means 
that the residual at time t is influenced by the size of the residual at time t-1. To deal with 
autocorrelation, Beck and Katz (1995) recommend adding a lagged dependent variable to the right-
hand side of the equation. We refrain from using this solution to alleviate the problem of 
autocorrelation for several reasons. First, we have no strong theoretical reason to model issue 
entrepreneurship in time t as a function of issue entrepreneurship at time t-1. Second, estimating 
                                                          
9
 A possible alternative model specification would be to estimate the model as a three-level random-effects model 
with parties nested within years and countries, and such a model generates very similar results to our model below. 
Similarly, the main findings also remain the same when using party fixed-effects (see Table 4, Models 3 & 4 in the 
Supporting Information). 
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such a model results in a rather large coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. Consequently, 
the estimated coefficients for the remaining variables fail to measure the effect of the independent 
variables on the level of issue entrepreneurship but explain the change in issue entrepreneurship. 
Third, and relatedly, Achen (2000) and Plümper, Troeger and Manow (2005) show that with 
trending in the independent variables and the error term, a lagged dependent variable introduces 
biases. Hence, to eliminate serial correlation of errors, we use instead the Prais-Winsten 
transformation (Greene 1992, 473) with a panel specific AR(1) error structure (Plümper, Troeger 
and Manow 2005, 349). Diagnostic tests indicate that our estimation strategy produces white noise 
residuals. Table 4 in the Supporting Information shows the robustness of the results using different 
sub-samples and estimation strategies. The next section discusses the empirical results. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
To test our theoretical propositions, we estimate three models. Model 1 tests the hypotheses H1a 
through H1c about “political loss”, by estimating the effect of government coalition membership, 
distance to the mean party position and electoral defeat on issue entrepreneurship. Model 2 tests 
hypotheses H2a and H3 concerning the potential for parties to become a winner on the specific EU 
dimension, by estimating EU issue entrepreneurship as a function of distance to the mean voter on 
the EU dimension as well as internal party unity on the EU dimension. Finally, the third model 
combines the two models of loser on traditional dimension and potential winner on new dimension. 
It also estimates the moderating impact of “political loss” on the effect of internal unity on issue 
entrepreneurship (H2b). Model 3a shows the results of this estimating using the full dataset, 
whereas Model 3b shows the same estimation using the smaller dataset without imputation. The 
results are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Explaining EU Issue Entrepreneurship 
  
Model 1: Political 
losers 
Model 2: 
Winning issues 
Model 3a: Loss 
and dissent 
Model 3b: No 
imputation 
  
Coeff. PCSE   Coeff. PCSE   Coeff. PCSE   Coeff. PCSE 
  
Intercept -0.64 0.27 ** 8.53 0.46 *** 6.39 0.58 *** 1.30 0.90 
Party size -0.09 0.01 *** -0.05 0.01 *** -0.14 0.00 *** -0.12 0.01 *** 
EU support  0.00 0.07 
 
-2.14 0.14 *** -2.29 0.14 *** -2.92 0.30 *** 
Political loser components 
 
 
  
 
    
No government 
experience 1.33 0.11 *** - -  - -  - -  
Gov't experience 
(opposition) 0.01 0.05  - -  - -  - -  
Distance to mean party 
(LR) 0.18 0.02 *** - -  - -  - -  
Electoral defeat 0.04 0.00 *** - - 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
Winning issue 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Distance to mean voter 
(EU) - -  -2.87 0.10 *** -3.06 0.11 *** -4.02 0.15 *** 
Internal dissent (EU) - - 
 
-0.31 0.07 *** 0.22 0.16 2.74 0.29 *** 
Political loser index (LR) - - 
 
- - 
 
1.41 0.14 *** 5.14 0.21 *** 
Political loser*Dissent - - 
 
- - 
 
-0.29 0.06 *** -1.61 0.11 *** 
N (observations, groups) 2690, 160   2473, 160   2473, 160   720, 152     
 
 
Notes: Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients correcting for panel-specific 
autocorrelation in error terms over one period (AR1) with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses 
and country dummies (not shown due to space limitations). Model 3b is the same as model 3a, but 
without imputed party expert data. Hence this model only contains data from years with CHES 
surveys, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002 & 2006. 
*** significant at p ≤ 0.01; ** significant at p ≤ 0.05 (two-tailed).
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Model 1 demonstrates that parties with no coalition experience are significantly more likely 
to become issue entrepreneurs. In contrast, parties in opposition with previous coalition experience 
are no different from parties that are currently members of a governing coalition (reference 
category). Next, the results also lend credence to the idea that being a losing party in terms of 
policy-seeking goals matters for issue entrepreneurship. The distance to the mean party position on 
the left-right dimension has a negative and significant effect. Finally, we also find that electoral 
defeat has a significant effect on the likelihood of becoming an issue entrepreneur. The greater the 
electoral loss a party experienced compared to the previous election, the greater the degree of issue 
entrepreneurship. These findings are in line with our first hypotheses (H1a-c).10 Overall, Model 1 
shows that being a loser on the dominant dimension of contestation in terms of parties’ office-, 
policy- and vote-seeking objectives makes it much more likely that a party becomes an issue 
entrepreneur, even when controlling for party size.11  
The next question addressed in Model 2 is whether promoting the EU dimension is 
perceived as a potentially winning strategy. In the theory section, we argued that this depends 
primarily on the distance to the mean voter on the EU dimension (H3) and the degree of internal 
unity, or lack of dissent, on this dimension (H2a).  As hypothesized, we find that parties closer to 
the mean voter on the EU dimension are more likely to become EU issue entrepreneurs. This 
suggests that parties indeed care about attracting new voters when they embark on an issue 
                                                          
10
 As a possible alternative operationalization of the vote-seeking component of political loss, we ran the model 
using the distance to the mean voter on the left-right dimension. The idea here is that parties which are further 
removed from the mean voter position on the dominant dimension have trouble appealing to the majority of voters 
that hold centrist positions. Due to their disadvantageous position on the dominant dimension these parties 
experience a ceiling in their vote maximization. As a result, they have an incentive to introduce a new issue 
dimension. This operationalization yields almost identical results to those reported here in Table 1, for these results 
see Table 1 Models 3 and 4 in the Supporting Information. The only result that changes compared to the model we 
present here is that the distance to the mean party on the dominant dimension fails to reach statistical significance 
when distance to the mean voter on left-right is included. This is, however, most likely due to multicollinearity in the 
model, as Distance Mean Party Position on the Dominant Dimension and Distance to the Mean Voter on the 
Dominant Dimension are unsurprisingly highly correlated – at r=0.59 significant at p ≤ 0.01 level. Thus when we 
exclude the variable tapping into the distance to the mean voter from the model, the variable capturing distance to 
the mean party position does gain statistical significance. Due to this multicollinearity problem, we feel more 
comfortable operationalizing political loss on a vote-seeking dimension by a measure tapping into vote loss 
between the current and previous elections. 
11These results are also robust if we include party family dummies in the model, but for the sake of parsimony we 
have left these dummies out of the models shown here. 
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entrepreneurship strategy. The model also shows that parties that are not internally united on the 
EU dimension are less likely to adopt a strategy of issue entrepreneurship. Our propositions are 
thus corroborated also when controlling for country-level Euroskepticism, which unsurprisingly is 
positively associated with issue entrepreneurship on the EU dimension. 
The final model combines the degree to which a party can be classified as a political loser 
in terms of office-, policy- and vote-seeking incentives on the dominant dimension and as a 
potential winner on the previously ignored issue in a single model. In order to circumvent multi-
collinearity and ease interpretation, we created a single scale tapping into the three components of 
political loss, namely government coalition membership, distance to mean party position, and 
electoral loss. Moreover, the model also includes an interaction between internal dissent and degree 
of the three components of “political loss” to test the hypothesis that the effect of internal dissent 
on EU entrepreneurship is moderated by the extent to which parties are losers on the traditional 
dimension (H2b). The results in Table 1 show that a significant interaction between political loss 
and internal dissent exists which is in the expected direction, thus indicating that issue 
entrepreneurship is decided by both a party’s position on the current dominant dimension and the 
potential to win votes on the basis of the previously ignored issue. We see these results both when 
using the imputed dataset (Model 3a) and when using the smaller dataset without imputation 
(Model 3b).  However, to interpret how being a political losers conditions the effect of internal 
dissent on issue entrepreneurship, it is not sufficient to simply look at significance of the interaction 
term since there is no way of knowing from the information presented in Table 1 what the impact 
of the condition is when its value is greater than zero (see Brambor et al 2006). Instead, we 
graphically illustrate how the marginal effect of internal dissent on the EU on issue 
entrepreneurship changes across different levels of the “political loser scale” in Figure 1. The 
decreasing slope in Figure 1 demonstrates that internal dissent only has a negative effect on EU 
entrepreneurship for parties that stand to lose on the current dimension. For winning parties, 
internal dissent on the new issue does not affect their likelihood of mobilizing that issue. In other 
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words, while political losers are generally more likely to mobilize a previously ignored issue, they 
are less likely to do so if they are internally divided on that issue. This makes sense, since it could 
be too much of a risk to promote a previously ignored issue for parties that are already marginal on 
the existing dimension of party competition, unless the party leadership is strongly united (H2b). 
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Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Internal Dissent on EU Issue Entrepreneurship, Modified by 
Political Loss 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of EU internal dissent on EU issue entrepreneurship, 
modified by the ’political loser’ status on the left-right dimension (95% confidence intervals shown with 
dashed lines). The marginal effects are based on Model 3a in Table 1. 
 
Discussion 
This study presents a theory of issue entrepreneurship in multiparty systems, which models when 
and why parties put previously ignored issues onto the political agenda. Our model builds on the 
core idea of the classic theories of issue evolution and issue manipulation by Carmines and Stimson 
as well as Riker, namely that parties become issue entrepreneurs when they are losers on the 
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dominant dimension of contestation. Yet, this study extends this intuition to a multiparty setting, 
where the issue strategies of parties are also influenced by considerations about the potential for 
future coalition formation. To capture this strategic environment, our model does not simply 
distinguish between parties in office and in opposition, but identifies three component of “political 
loss” that make parties more likely to engage in issue entrepreneurship, namely lack of government 
experience, a non-mainstream position on the main dimension of political conflict, and electoral 
defeat. Whereas opposition parties in general will be cautious about engaging in issue 
entrepreneurial strategies, as it may harm their future coalition changes, we hypothesize that parties 
which lack such coalition potential have strong incentives to upset the existing equilibrium by 
highlighting a previously ignored issue, because they are less constrained by office-seeking 
motivations. Moreover, our model presents specific hypotheses about the conditions under which 
parties will choose to promote a specific issue, highlighting the importance of vote-seeking and 
policy-seeking considerations based on mean voter distance and internal cohesion. 
We have tested these propositions by examining the dynamics of the EU issue in Western 
European party systems across three decades, and the findings lend strong support to our model. 
The empirical analysis highlights three important findings. First, we find that parties that lack 
office-holding experience, hold non-mainstream policy positions and have suffered electoral 
defeat are most likely to act as issue entrepreneurs. Second, parties only highlight a previously 
ignored issue when it is conceived as a potentially winning strategy. Specifically, parties only 
promote a previously ignored issue when their policy position is close to the mean voter position 
and when their position is characterized by a lack of internal dissent. Third, political losers are 
generally more likely to mobilize a previously ignored issue, but are less likely to do so if they are 
internally divided. From a strategic point of view this is very plausible as such parties only want to 
promote previously ignored issues from which they can gain electoral leverage and display unity 
in terms of policy. Consequently, it would simply constitute too much of a risk to promote a 
previously ignored issue for those parties that already occupy a marginal position on the existing 
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dimension of political conflict, unless the party leadership is strongly united. 
The results presented here also give rise to important avenues for future research. We 
demonstrate that the dimensional basis of party competition is never a stable equilibrium, but 
always under pressure of the actions of issue entrepreneurs, and this raises further questions about 
the nature of party competition. How do mainstream parties respond to the strategies of issue 
entrepreneurs? When do new issues become mainstream issues? Notwithstanding the importance of 
these topics for future research, this study has provided important new insights into our 
understanding of the dynamics of the dimensional structure of party competition within multiparty 
systems. By developing a theory of issue entrepreneurship that allows political scientists to 
understand the politicization of previously ignored issues in a variety of institutional contexts and 
by testing the theoretical conjectures based on data about the politicization of the EU issue in 
Western Europe, this study has important implications for our understanding of the way issues 
evolve. The application of our issue entrepreneurship model to the EU issue has shown that parties 
in losing positions on the dominant dimension of political competition play a crucial role in 
instigating dimensional change. The main theoretical implication is not confined to the particular 
case of issues relating to the EU, but should also hold for other important issues that have gained 
political prominence, such as the immigration issue. This is a topic for future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2 below presents descriptive statistics of all variables included in the analyses. Note that 
we have also provided a Supporting Information document, detailing the results of a variety of 
robustness checks. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Issue entrepreneurship 2848 -0.6 6 -16 16 
Party size 2812 11.2 13 0 51 
EU support (country mean) 2853 2.5 0 2 3 
No government experience 2853 0.5 0 0 1 
Coalition experience (opposition) 2853 0.3 0 0 1 
Distance to mean party (LR) 2853 2.1 1 0 7 
Electoral defeat 2710 0.0 4 -20 23 
Distance to mean voter (EU) 2602 0.9 0 0 2 
Internal dissent (EU) 2853 2.1 1 0 5 
Political loser index (LR) 2710 2.5 1 0 4 
= 
